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January 28, 2011

The "Third Way" to being a Third-World Country

In early January of 2011, President Obama announced Bill Daley (brother of Chicago mayor Richard Daley and former executive at JPM Chase) as his new Chief of Staff, replacing Chicago mayoral candidate Rahm Emanuel. (Some revolving door, eh?) Less well-known is the fact that, up until his appointment, Bill Daley was a member of the Board of Trustees for Third Way, which bills itself as an “influential think-tank that creates and advances moderate policy and political ideas. Therefore, the early January release by Third Way of a domestic policy memo outlining a plan for “Fixing Foreclosure-gate” may well be a trial balloon for the Obama administration’s next set of policies for dealing with the ongoing housing crisis. We can only hope that it won’t be any worse than the administration’s ongoing--the miserable failure known as the Home Affordable Modification Program, or “HAMP.”

Unfortunately, our hopes would be in vain, because this memo outlines a Federal power grab, taking precedence over 400 years of well-settled real-property case law. Essentially, it proposes that Congress pass legislation that would, among other things, provide “a ‘safe harbor’ barring paperwork-related litigation on certain foreclosures,” and establish “a statute of limitations to limit the time period in which suits can be brought.” In other words, it would over-ride states’ rights to decide real-property law, and, to “protect” the rights of “injured homeowners,” it would simply eliminate many of those rights.

Why did Third Way release this memo at this point in time? It is a direct response to the early January decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on the “Ibanez” case, which found that banks must follow established state law when foreclosing on delinquent borrowers. Unfortunately for the banks, they simply do not appear to be able to meet these state requirements for foreclosing on a property—little things like proving that they actually own the mortgage and its underlying promissory note. As the first state Supreme Court ruling on this foreclosure issue, the Massachusetts decision sets a powerful and important precedent for courts in other states to follow.

In the rush to securitization during the last decade, Wall Street bankers cut corners—failing to document changes in the chains of titles of millions of mortgages and their underlying promissory notes, as required by state law in all 50 states. Much of this was done to avoid the usually minimal county-level fees charged for recording a mortgage; in other words, tax evasion. Everyone knows about the sloppy paperwork in extending mortgages, to so-called NINJA loans (no income, no job or assets); why would we think that their execution of mortgage securitization would be any better. We are now learning that it was not.

So, in order to save Wall Street for the umpteenth time during the ongoing crisis, Washington is flailing around looking for a way to blunt this latest threat to big-bank solvency. The Third Way memo may be a glimpse of what to expect in coming months. If the administration does go down this path, it will once again be setting itself, and the economy, up for abject failure. Any attempt to usurp states’ rights will be met with a flurry of lawsuits that will ultimately have to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court. During the interim, these pesky foreclosure lawsuits will continue to wind their ways through the remaining 49 states, likely to outcomes as unfavorable to banks as “Ibanez” decision in Massachusetts.

More and more, it looks like the 2010s will be a “lost decade” for the U.S. economy, just as were the 1990s for Japan.  Until we clean up the balance sheets of our financial institutions, our crippled economy will continue to limp along, unable to create jobs or meaningful growth. Trampling on the legal rights of states and homeowners in order to bail out the Big Banks is simply not the way to accomplish this cleanup; instead, it is the sort of crony capitalism that is the trademark of third-world countries. The real solution is for bank regulators to “mark to market” the assets of the Big Banks, and place the insolvent ones into receiverships. 

Note: This blog appeared as an opinion editorial in the January 19 print edition of the Washington Times:

January 05, 2011

Another Back-Door Bailout of Bank of America?

December was a bad month for Bank of America, with two major setbacks in the courts over efforts to force it to buy back poor-quality mortgages that Countrywide packaged into mortgage-backed securities and foisted off on unsuspecting investors. Because BofA purchased Countrywide back in 2008, it is now responsible for claims against that institution.

First, MBIA won a ruling that allows it to use “statistical sampling” to prove that Countrywide lied about the quality of these mortgages; BofA’s CEO had vowed to fight these claims “mortgage by mortgage,” which would have been prohibitively expensive for plaintiffs. Now, plaintiffs can analyze a “sample” of mortgages from each security pool rather than each and every mortgage, which is a huge victory for MBIA and other plaintiffs.

Next, Allstate sued BofA over mortgage-backed securities bought from Countrywide back in 2005, alleging “fraud, negligent misrepresentation and violation of U.S. securities laws”; essentially, Allstate is claiming that Countrywide lied in the “representations and warranties” it had made about the quality of the mortgages underlying those securities. In its filing, Allstate presented a series of “smoking guns” that have emerged from other lawsuits against Countrywide, clearly demonstrating that the quality of those mortgages was far inferior to what was claimed the information provided to investors.

So it was something of a shock on Jan. 3, when BofA announced that it has reached a paltry $4 billion settlement with Fannie and Freddie over “outstanding and potential repurchase claims” by the GSEs against BofA over “legacy Countrywide loans.”  Industry observers were incredulous over how the GSEs came to a settlement with BofA,  just as the courts were beginning to shed disinfecting sunlight on Countrywide’s egregious behavior. More shocking was the amount of the settlement, which amounted to only about two cents on the dollar value of mortgages covered by the settlement. The only rational explanation appears to be that the GSEs, under orders from their government overseers (remember, the U.S. government, i.e., we taxpayers, now own 80% of both Fannie and Freddie), are making yet another back-door bailout of BofA, which most objective observers agree would be insolvent were it forced to buy back the bad mortgages made by Countrywide.

Diving deeper into the BofA press release reveals a vast disparity in the two settlements. For $1.3 billion, Freddie agreed to settle all “outstanding and potential” claims related to $127 billion of Countrywide mortgages that it had purchased—a recovery rate of about one penny on each dollar. In contrast, Fannie agreed to take $1.5 billion to settle only existing claims on only $4 billion of Countrywide mortgages that it had purchased—a recovery rate of 38 cents on the dollar. Clearly, Fannie appears to be holding out for a much larger payday, as it purchased more than half a trillion dollars in mortgages from Countrywide. So why did Freddie offer BofA such a sweet deal? That is an interesting question that Congressional investigators should be asking!

January 01, 2011

Wearing their Mortgage Servicing Hats, the Big Banks are Destroying Our Economy

The U.S. housing crisis is now entering its fourth year, yet, according to Lender Processing Services, more than 2 million homes are currently in the process of foreclosure and another 2 million are seriously delinquent, having missed more than three monthly payments. Moreover, the average home in the process of foreclosure has been delinquent more than 16 months. How can this be? Certainly, it is in the best interests of both borrower and lender to quickly resolve a delinquency; the borrower wants to avoid eviction while the lender wants to avoid the typical 50-pecent-plus loss associated with a residential foreclosure.

The answer lies in the perverse incentive put in place by the Wall-Street securitization machine; in particular, the perverse incentives facing the once-obscure entities known as “mortgage servicers.” These servicers, the largest of which are subsidiaries of “Big Four” banks—Bank of America, Citibank, JPM Chase and Wells Fargo, do the “grunt work” formerly done by mortgage-portfolio lenders. For a small fee, they collect monthly mortgage payments and distribute them to the investors who purchased the rights to mortgage cash-flows in the form of residential mortgage-backed securities or “sliced and diced” derivative securities, such as collateralized debt obligations.

 The perverse incentives arise because of provisions in the Pooling and Servicing Agreements, which are the contracts that govern the mortgage-backed securities. These provisions provide for the servicers and their affiliates to extract late fees and other forms of income (foreclosure fees, forced-insurance premiums, property inspection fees, property valuation fees, etc.) from the often unwary delinquent homeowner. Moreover, these fees and income typically are paid to servicers before any payments go to the investor-lenders. Consequently, they rob equity from the homeowner and, once that equity is exhausted, rob principal and interest payments from the investor-lender. These fees include monthly “late fees” similar to those for a missed credit card payment; they can be quite substantial relative to the monthly mortgage payment and, cumulatively, can quickly move a delinquent homeowner from a positive- to a negative-equity position, making foreclosure all but a certainty.

Now consider how these fee incentives affect a servicer’s behavior regarding mortgage modifications. Should the delinquent mortgage be successfully modified or refinanced, or should a short sale occur, then the servicer’s income stream is cut off—totally in the event of a short sale or refinancing. Faced with this loss of income, the servicer will do everything in its power to avoid permanent modifications and short sales; instead, they will do everything they can to prolong the mortgage delinquency. These fee incentives also go a long way in explaining the abysmal performance of the Home Affordable Modification Program, more commonly known as “HAMP;” servicers enticed borrowers into trial modifications with promises of permanent modifications, only to push the borrowers so much farther underwater that they could not pass the infamous HAMP Net-Present-Value test that requires a permanent modification to be “less costly” than foreclosure. According to the Treasury Department’s Oct. 2010 HAMP Report, servicers had converted 85% of trial offers into trial modifications, but converted only 37% of trial modifications into permanent modification.

Compounding these fee incentives is a more insidious conflict of interest. According to a Nov. 16 press release from the Association of Mortgage Investors, which represents the investors who actually own most delinquent mortgages, but have delegated the servicing of these mortgages to subsidiaries of the Big Four banks, foreclosure-mitigation programs “have often proven unsuccessful due to servicers, who invariably are the second-lien holders, and who continue to inhibit sustainable modifications” of the delinquent mortgages. In other words, the banks that own the servicers also have extended second mortgages on the same properties that they are servicing, and are pursuing their own best interests to the detriment of the investors they represent as servicers. Therefore, it is not surprising that Big Four bank converted only 78% of HAMP trial offers into trial modifications, and only 30% of trial modifications into permanent modification, while the rest of the industry converted 99% of trial offers into trial modifications and 50% of trial modifications into permanent modifications. Incentives matter.

How can we solve this problem? Simple. Fix the perverse incentive structure facing the servicers. First, regulators, the courts, and state Attorneys General can limit the outrageous late fees, forced-insurance premiums and other fees charged by servicers and their affiliates. Thus far, these institutions have failed miserably in this area, but, currently, regulators are conducting on-site examinations of the largest servicers and the Attorneys General are coordinating actions against the servicers in response to the robo-signing scandal. Second, regulators or Congress can move to force the big banks to divest their mortgage-servicing subsidiaries and to “mark-to-market” their second-lien portfolios. This would remove the banks’ incentives to extend delinquencies in order to protect the value of their second liens. Third, the 27 states with statutory foreclosure rules, which have allowed servicers to run amok without meaningful legal review, should rethink adoption of judicial foreclosure rules. Were it not for the actions of defense attorneys in judicial-foreclosure states, we would not know about the pervasiveness of perjury and fraud that we now know to be commonplace in servicing industry.

Only when we have restored sanity to loan servicing will we see successful mortgage modifications that are not only in the best interests of delinquent borrowers and the U.S. housing market in general, but are also in the best interests of mortgage investors, who all too often have been made the bogeymen for the bad behavior of the servicers. Once the avalanche of foreclosures has been replaced a wave of sustainable permanent modifications, the U.S. housing market can stabilize, and with it, the U.S. economy as a whole.

Note: This entry appeared as an op-ed in the Washington Times on Dec. 17, 2010 and is available online at:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/17/big-banks-profiting-fromforeclosure-crisis/  


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