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January 30, 2010

January 30, 2010: Grading the Bernanke Fed

On January 28, 2009, the U.S. Senate voted 70-30 to confirm Ben Bernanke for a second four-year term as Fed Chairman. While this lopsided margin sounds like a resounding endorsement, in fact, it was narrowest in the history of the Fed. Prominent senators on both the right (Jim DeMint (R-SC)) and left (Barbara Boxer (D-CA)) opposed Bernanke’s bid for a second term.

Prior to this vote, the narrowest margin was 84-16 in favor of Paul Volker’s second term in 1983, after what had, up until now, been acknowledged as the worst U.S. recession since the Great Depression. (Unemployment was actually higher in 1983 at 10.8% than the 10.2% peak recorded during 2009).

Why the opposition to Bernanke? To better understand the opposition to Bernanke, let us consider the Fed’s three main areas of responsibility: (i) monetary policy; (ii) consumer protection; and (iii) bank regulation.

The Fed’s monetary policy is driven by a dual mandate: keep inflation and unemployment low. While the Bernanke Fed kept inflation under check, many economists (including this one) think that Bernanke’s “easy-money” policy on interest rates led to excessive leverage, (i.e., borrowing) in the financial system, which not only created the housing bubble but also fueled speculation by investment banks, hedge funds and other financial institutions, leading to the ongoing financial crisis. We now have a 10.0% unemployment rate. Moreover, the Bernanke Fed has more than doubled the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, from about $800 billion before the crisis, to more than $2.25 trillion in the most recent week. While most of this increase was initially for “liquidity facilities” used to provide liquidity to the financial markets during the crisis, the Fed has wound down most of these facilities and replaced those assets with purchases of $1.25 trillion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) designed to keep mortgage-interest rates low. The Fed now has to craft an “exit strategy” for reducing its balance sheet in order to keep the money supply from exploding and causing double-digit (or worse) inflation. Yet, if the Fed sells the MBSs, which  no other entity would purchase during 2009, it risks pushing mortgage-interest rates up by hundreds of basis points. If rates rise while the Fed holds these MBSs, then the Fed will lose hundreds of billions because the market value of the long-duration securities will fall precipitously as rates rise. One can easily arrive at a grade of “F” for Bernanke’s monetary policy.

Next, consider the Bernanke Fed’s record on consumer protection—not a pretty picture. Under Bernanke, the Fed failed miserably in protecting consumers from predatory mortgage lenders, who saddled uninformed borrowers with “teaser-rate” mortgages, option ARMs, subprime mortgages and usurious credit-card loans. It also failed to reign in home-equity loans, which consumers used to turn their homes into piggy banks, paying off credit card balances with cash-out home-loan refinancings. The four largest banks hold more than $400 billion in home-equity loans that, if marked to market values, would be worth pennies on the dollar, wiping out the capital of these systemically important “too-big-to-fail” banks. Again, one can easily arrive at a grade of “F” for Bernanke’s record on consumer protection.

This leads us to the third main area of the Fed’s responsibility—bank regulation. Under the Bernanke Fed, the big Wall Street banks funded lines of credit to the unscrupulous mortgage brokers who originated the toxic home mortgages (subprime, Alt-A, Option ARM, stated income, etc.) that Wall Street securitized and led to the financial crisis. Two of the four largest bank holding companies--$2 trillion Citigroup and $800 billion Wachovia--arguably failed (or had to be bailed out by taxpayers). The Fed is the primary regulator for bank holding companies. Losses at failed banks have pushed the FDIC into insolvency for the first time since the early 1990s, and the banking system is in shambles, with more than a thousand banks in serious danger of failure. The widely publicized “stress tests” of the 19 largest bank holding companies were designed by the Fed and have been roundly criticized as a total fraud. Under Bernanke, the Fed punted on providing liquidity to Bear and Lehman, allowing them to fail, but somehow figured out how to allow Goldman Sachs and  Morgan Stanley to become bank holding companies, which saved them from insolvency. In so doing, Bernanke extended the taxpayer safety net to these two investment banks, which were largely responsible for creating the financial crisis. Again, it is easy to arrive at a grade of “F” for the Bernanke Fed’s record on bank regulation.

With grades of “F” in each of the Fed’s main areas or responsibility, it is truly amazing to this economist how 70 U.S. Senators and the President could possibly consider Bernanke fit to serve another term. It just goes to show how, in the world of Washington politics, nothing succeeds like failure.

The financial crisis isn't over. We are looking at either double-digit inflation (perhaps the best case) or a massive double-dip recession (the worst case).

January 16, 2010

Jan. 16, 2010: Update on the HAMP (Home Affordable Mortgage Program)

Yesterday, the Treasury Department released its December 2009 report on the Obama administration’s foreclosure-prevention plan, and it was quickly criticized. The Home Affordable Mortgage Program, or “HAMP” as it come to be known by its acronym, was announced in March 4, 2009 press release as part of the broader Making Home Affordable (“MHA”) program designed to help “up to 7 to 9 million families restructure their mortgages to avoid foreclosure”. The $75 billion HAMP was targeted at “3 to 4 Million At-Risk Homeowners” with mortgages originated prior to Jan. 1, 2009 and that are more than 30 days delinquent.

Press releases about the program have been confusing, with language similar to the ‘save or create three million jobs” mantra of the $787 billion Stimulus Package. Back on August 4, 2009, a Treasury press release announcing the July 2009 HAMP performance report boasted that “more than 400,000 modification offers have been extended and more than 230,000 trial modifications have begun” and that the program was “on track to offer assistance to up to 3 to 4 million  homeowners.”  Notice the key operative word here—“offer.”  An “offer” to help is the Stimulus-talk equivalent a “saved” job, but slightly better because you can at least measure an “offer.” The administration is still struggling with how to “measure” a saved job

Also note the emphasis on “trial modification” rather than “permanent modification.” In fact, not a single word was mentioned in the press release or the report about permanent modifications because there had been so few of them.

Yesterday’s headline trumpeted “more than 850,000 homeowners now with median payment reductions exceeding $500.” What this headline doesn’t tell you is that these are “trial modifications” rather than “permanent modifications.” The headline continues “more than 110,000 permanent modifications approved to date.” What this doesn’t tell you is that the actual report quantifies the number of permanent modifications at only 66,465, or only 7.4% of the 902,620 trial modifications claimed in the report; where the other ~44,000 permanent modifications claimed in the Treasury press release come from we do not know. (Perhaps they are simply bad at math?) Also not mentioned is the fact that most experts forecast a “redefault rate” (i.e., the borrower defaults on the modified mortgage)  of more than 50 percent during the first twelve months following a modification, and that this rate could be even higher should the employment situation continue to deteriorate during 2010.

The report also includes a set of four spiffy graphs showing what the administration would like you to think are “green shoots” in the U.S. housing market. What they don’t show you is the delinquency- and foreclosure-rates, which, when combined, have continued to make new monthly highs during almost every month since the HAMP was announced. From March 2009 to November 2009, the non-current loan rate, which is the sum of the delinquency and foreclosure rates, has risen from 10.33% to 13.24%--an increase of 28 percent.

This perky housing report also calls to mind the "Stimulus-talk" or "Obama-Speak" about “saving or creating” 600,000 jobs during the same time period when the Household Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows a loss of more than 5.5 million jobs. Now, we are told that we have “saved” 850,000 homeowners during the same time that an additional 1.05 million homeowners have become non-current on their mortgages. And, of course, this number doesn’t include the hundreds of thousands who lost their homes during this period—they aren’t included in the non-current loan rate once they get booted and their house sold at auction.

The latest criticism of the HAMP comes as hundreds of thousands of homeowners who have entered into “trial modification” are at risk of disqualification. The program requires these borrowers to make three monthly payments on their modified mortgages and fill out required paperwork in order to qualify for a “permanent modification.”  What is holding up the process is the troublesome paperwork. Borrowers actually have to document their income to qualify for the permanent modification, but a large portion of these borrowers originally took out “stated-income” mortgages (also known as “liar loans”) and many of these are having difficulty documenting enough income even for the modified mortgage.  Many more have lost their jobs or taken significant pay cuts that preclude them from qualifying even for the modified mortgage.

Now, I’m not a rocket scientist, but it seems pretty obvious to me that you should allow the trial modifications to continue so long as the homeowner continues to stay current on the modified mortgage. Foreclosing on these homes will only exacerbate what is already a disastrous situation in the residential mortgage market by adding to the inventory of vacant houses. Moreover, we know that a significant portion of foreclosed homes are stripped and vandalized as soon as the former owner vacates, leaving a blighted and damaged structure that is of little value to the lender and dragging down property values in the surrounding neighborhoods. It is a far better option to keep someone living in these houses by extending the trial modifications.

No one benefits by evicting these borrowers. Let them stay--and pay.

January 08, 2010

Jan. 8, 2010: The December 2009 Employment Report: Green Shoots Crushed (Again)

Today, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) released the employment report for December 2009. The consensus forecast among economists was for job losses of about 10,000, but the BLS number came in at -85,000, a serious setback after only -11,000 in November, revised to a positive 4,000. the U3 unemployment rate remained at 10.0% representing 15.3 million persons, but the more comprehensive

Hidden from the headline numbers was far worse news. The Household Survey shows the December job losses at a staggering 589,000, comparable to the worse days of the financial crisis. Unemployment actually fell by 73,000 as 843,000 persons left the labor force. Had those losing jobs remained in the labor force rather than giving up, the unemployment rate would have spiked upwards to 10.4%. Now these former workers show up in the U6 unemployment rate, which included discouraged workers who are no longer actively looking for jobs; that rate moved upwards to 17.3% (representing 26.5 million persons) from 17.2% in November.

So now it appears that the hopeful numbers from November 2009 were most likely just a statistical blip, as was the improvement back in July 2009. This bodes poorly for the economy, especially for the U.S. housing market. People without jobs can’t pay their mortgages. People who can’t pay their mortgages feed the growing shadow inventory of homes facing foreclosure. The growing shadow inventory of homes facing foreclosure continues to drag down the housing market and, with it, the U.S. economy. A “double-dip” recession during 2010 looks like all but certainty at this point.

The “green shoots” apparent in the November employment numbers apparently were just an illusion. Perhaps now the administration will heed the wisdom of James Carville, who famously advised Bill Clinton during his 1992 presidential campaign “It’s the economy, stupid!”  It is long past time for the President and Congress to focus on creating jobs rather than creating trillion-dollar deficits.

Some "Happy New Year," eh?

 


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